LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS UNDER SECTION 85 OF THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023: THE SUPREME COURT CLARIFIES THE LAW
The Supreme Court has adopted a balanced approach by extending protection against domestic cruelty to genuine marriage-like relationships while excluding casual or temporary live-in arrangements. The decision reinforces the principle that the substance and intention of a domestic relationship are more significant than its mere formal legal status.

The offence of cruelty against a married woman is now punishable under Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), which replaces the erstwhile Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The provision was enacted to protect women from physical, mental and economic cruelty within domestic relationships. Traditionally, its protection was understood to extend only to women in legally valid marriages. However, changing social realities and the increasing prevalence of live-in relationships have compelled courts to examine whether women in marriage-like relationships should also receive protection under criminal law. The Supreme Court has recently addressed this issue in Dr. Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka (2026) by recognising that certain live-in relationships may attract the protection of Section 85 BNS, while making it equally clear that not every live-in relationship would fall within its ambit.
Section 85 BNS criminalises cruelty committed by a husband or his relatives against a woman. "Cruelty" includes wilful conduct likely to drive a woman to commit suicide, cause grave injury to her life or health, or subject her to harassment for unlawful demands of money or property. Being a welfare-oriented penal provision, its object is to protect women from domestic abuse and matrimonial cruelty. Consequently, the provision has consistently been interpreted by courts in a purposive manner so that its social objective is achieved rather than defeated by technical legal requirements.
The controversy before the Supreme Court arose when the complainant alleged that the accused had concealed his existing marriage, undergone a marriage ceremony with her, and thereafter lived with her as husband and wife. During their cohabitation, she alleged that she was subjected to cruelty. The Karnataka High Court quashed the proceedings under Section 498A IPC on the ground that the marriage was void because the accused already had a legally wedded wife. The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether the protection against matrimonial cruelty is available only where there is a legally valid marriage or whether it can also extend to relationships that substantially resemble marriage.
The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision and held that the object of Section 85 BNS is to punish cruelty occurring within domestic relationships functioning as marriages and not merely those satisfying every technical requirement of matrimonial law. Therefore, a woman cannot be denied protection solely because the marriage is legally void or suffers from a technical defect. At the same time, the Court clarified that the protection is available only where the relationship is "in the nature of marriage" and not to every live-in arrangement.
The Court's reasoning is consistent with the jurisprudence developed under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. In D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469, the Supreme Court held that every live-in relationship cannot be equated with marriage. A relationship would qualify as one "in the nature of marriage" only if the parties are legally competent to marry, voluntarily cohabit for a considerable period, maintain a shared household, and present themselves before society as husband and wife. Casual or temporary relationships do not satisfy this test.
The principles laid down in D. Velusamy were further expanded in Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755, where the Supreme Court identified several factors for determining whether a relationship resembles marriage. These include the duration of cohabitation, financial interdependence, domestic arrangements, emotional commitment, common residence, public recognition of the relationship, and the overall conduct of the parties. The Court clarified that these factors are only indicators and that every case must ultimately be decided on its own facts.
Building upon these earlier decisions, the Supreme Court in Dr. Lokesh B.H. introduced an additional and significant requirement. The Court held that merely proving a relationship "in the nature of marriage" is not sufficient. The complainant must also establish that both parties intended to enter into a marital relationship. This requirement distinguishes genuine marriage-like relationships from casual live-in arrangements. The intention to marry may be inferred from the conduct of the parties, their communications, shared responsibilities, financial arrangements, and other surrounding circumstances. However, whether such intention exists remains a question of fact to be decided on the evidence produced in each case.
The insistence on proving an intention to marry serves two important purposes. First, it ensures that women living in genuine domestic relationships are not denied protection merely because of technical defects in the validity of the marriage. Secondly, it prevents the indiscriminate extension of criminal liability to every consensual live-in relationship. Relationships entered into merely for companionship, convenience, or temporary cohabitation, without any intention to establish a permanent marital union, would remain outside the scope of Section 85 BNS.
The judgment also reflects the Supreme Court's concern regarding the misuse of matrimonial offences. The Court observed that criminal proceedings should not be initiated mechanically merely because two individuals have lived together. Before invoking Section 85 BNS, investigating authorities must examine whether the allegations disclose a genuine relationship possessing the characteristics of marriage. This approach is consistent with Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273, where the Supreme Court cautioned against automatic arrests in matrimonial disputes and emphasised the need for careful scrutiny before invoking the criminal process.
The judgment also finds support in earlier decisions such as Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha, (2011) 1 SCC 141, where the Supreme Court advocated a liberal interpretation of beneficial legislation to protect women in long-standing de facto marriages. Similarly, in Lalita Toppo v. State of Jharkhand, (2019) 13 SCC 796, the Court recognised that women in qualifying live-in relationships are entitled to seek remedies under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, reinforcing the principle that legal protection depends upon the substance of the relationship rather than its formal legal status.
The decision in Dr. Lokesh B.H. is therefore a significant milestone in the law governing live-in relationships. It acknowledges changing social realities while preserving the distinction between marriage-like relationships and casual cohabitation. The judgment makes it clear that Section 85 BNS is intended to punish domestic cruelty and not merely regulate matrimonial status. A woman in a genuine marriage-like relationship cannot be denied legal protection merely because the marriage is technically invalid. However, the prosecution must establish that the relationship possessed the essential characteristics of marriage and that both parties intended to create a permanent marital union. By laying down these safeguards, the Supreme Court has struck a careful balance between protecting women from domestic cruelty and preventing the unwarranted expansion of criminal liability, making this decision an important precedent governing the application of Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, to live-in relationships.
PUBLISHED BY:-
PRERIT SAHNI